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The fast-growing US ethanol industry has historically been characterized by large 
downstream investments made by farmers.  The authors assess the value which the 
stock market may hold for downstream investment by farmers as well as by ethanol 
manufacturers themselves.  The model framework used herein expands on the 
original VEST framework developed by Siebert, Jones and Sporleder.  A word of 
caution, the model herein is not intended to provide an on-going, risk-reducing 
business strategy.  However, it can and does provide a quick method to calculate the 
reasonableness of a downstream investment request that a farmer (or any business 
person) might be challenged to consider.  Although virtual stock market 
investments may certainly assist in value added performance, they (just like brick 
and mortar processing plants) can provide no guarantee of performance. 
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In their 1997 Agribusiness, an International Journal2 article entitled, “The VEST 
Model:  An Alternative Approach to Value Added,” Siebert, Jones and Sporleder 
began with a relatively simple observation.  Namely, when farmers take a further 
step to process the crop they are producing, these farmers are entering a new and 
different industry.  The authors went on to argue that, with only a little 
imagination, publicly traded stocks could be used to take such a step in a virtual 
fashion as opposed to a physical one.   
 
It is interesting to apply the VEST Model to the growth of the U.S. ethanol 
industry, a growth which has occurred in part due to direct investment by farmers 
via both cooperatives and limited liability companies.  When one asks why such 
direct investment took place rather than virtual stock market investments, a 
number of possible reasons surface.  These would include the following.  First, the 
presence of state and local government subsidies to encourage new ethanol 
production as a means of needed local economic development.  Second, few people 
within the US (outside of those in the rural Midwest) had sufficient familiarity with 
the ethanol industry to consider such investments.  Third, until recently no pure-
play, publicly-traded ethanol companies existed.  No doubt many other reasons can 
also be suggested.  
 
Today it is the case that several publicly traded firms have entered the ethanol 
industry and that recent capacity expansions have brought about new ethanol 
industry challenges.  Within such a context we examine the applicability of the 
VEST model to this industry.  We do so from both the perspective of a farmer 
considering integrating downstream (i.e., toward the consumer) into ethanol 
manufacturing as well as from the point of view of an ethanol plant manager 
regarding investment still farther downstream in the marketing chain.  Although 
only exploratory, the contributions of this research pertain to both a better 
understanding of the farmer-investors’ changed position in the marketing chain and 
also to what agribusiness managers might consider doing differently in regard to 
ethanol marketing and the stock market.  
 
A word of caution, this model is not necessarily intended to provide an on-going, 
risk-reducing strategy.  Instead it can be used to provide a timely look at the 
reasonableness of a downstream investment request that a farmer (or any business 
person) might be challenged to consider relative to their own pre-existing business.  
The Siebert, Jones and Sporleder model thus provides a timely yardstick.  The 
examination of the model is likely to sharpen the business manager’s (and 
                                                           
2 Agribusiness, an International Journal was published under the auspices of IAMA prior to 1998.  
At that time, IAMA ceased publishing that journal and began publishing the International Food and 
Agribusiness Management Review.   
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downstream investor’s) understanding at a time when they are being asked to make 
a large investment.  We find herein that on a per bushel basis ethanol plant stock 
market valuations are much less that that of ethanol plant construction costs.  This 
may, in and of itself, convey an important cautionary message to would be bricks 
and mortar investors.  Although virtual stock market investments may certainly 
assist in on-going value added performance, they (just like brick and mortar plants) 
provide no guarantee of future performance. 
   
The Vest Model 
 
With the VEST Model, Siebert, Jones and Sporleder made that case that farmers 
might do well to consider investments in publicly-held companies as an alternative 
to direct investment in their own further processing operations.  The vest equation 
was initially suggested so that interested farmers could calculate how much stock to 
purchase so as to virtually process their crop and hence capture the added value.  
This topic, of relating a crop’s production to the value added processing of that crop, 
has most certainly been a motivation for farmers building ethanol plants.  For 
example, to explain the motivation of a corn farmer who was also a member of the 
Mid Missouri Energy cooperative member, Reinhart, Weber and Shelman state, 
“when corn prices were high, he made money on corn.  When corn prices were low, 
he was potentially able to offset this with higher profits from the sale of ethanol” 
(p.1).  An investment in the right publicly held company could do the same thing.  
The VEST equation shows the stock investment, in dollars, needed to achieve this 
as,   
 
1) VEST = MKTCAP (FS / COGS) 
 
where, MKTCAP stands for market capitalization, or the value of all shares 
outstanding.  This is calculated as a public firm’s individual stock share price 
multiplied by its number of shares of stock.  FS denotes farm sales measured as the 
annual total sales of the farmer seeking a value added investment.  Last, COGS is 
the public firm’s annual cost of goods sold.  Conceptually, the ratio FS / COGS gives 
a farmer’s own crop sales dollars as a percentage of the public firm’s total raw 
product input purchases.  When this ratio is multiplied by MKTCAP, the result is 
the investment in shares (VEST) a farmer would need to make in order to virtually 
account for the processing volume of his/her farm’s crop.  From another perspective, 
the ratio of MKTCAP / COGS can be termed the VEST coefficient.  When the VEST 
coefficient is multiplied by any size farm sales (FS), the result again is VEST.   Note 
that the VEST model is intended to do much more than simply size a stock market 
investment in downstream processing to a farmer’s output.  It finds a mid-point 
between integrating downstream by means of the farmer building and running 
his/her own processing plant (or doing so via a co-operative or LLC) versus 
remaining as an independent producer with no downstream integration.   Siebert, 
Jones, and Sporleder discuss this matter when they present a table comparing nine 
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different characteristics of “farm raw commodities versus the finished product made 
from them” (p.562).   VEST eliminates the classic marketing cooperative conflict 
between a member and his/her cooperative because the farmer now stands at arms 
length from any such relationship as far as the VEST investment goes.  
 
Siebert, Jones and Sporleder calculated VEST coefficients for farmers in the red 
meat, poultry, and also grain sectors.  They stated that such a manner of investing 
in value added enterprises offered the following advantages:  “It does not require 
the hiring of new employees, the hiring of management, the purchase of facilities or 
equipment, the development of new products, the acquisition of new customers nor 
various other efforts.  Apart from the stock price itself, it eliminates the costs 
associated with vertical integration.  As a consequence the time required to manage 
a stock portfolio is much less than that needed to manage a bricks and mortar 
extension of the farm into value added or to participate in the governance of a 
cooperative” (p. 562-3).   They admit to several limitations of VEST including an 
“insurmountable limitation” for farmers who produce a commodity which is not 
processed by any publicly traded investor owned firm (p.566).  Of course, it must 
also be pointed out that when a farmer becomes his/her own customer, at least for 
the sales step from farmer to first handler, such a farmer gains substantially more 
control than is made available from a stock purchase. 
 
The Case of the Farmer and the Ethanol Plant 
 
One can compare the cost of constructing a new ethanol plant to the cost per bushel 
of investing in a publicly held ethanol firm.  Exhibit 1 shows the cost per bushel to 
construct 23 different corn-based U.S. ethanol plants.  These figures are from a wide 
variety of sources ranging from individual manufacturing plant’s websites, to local 
newspapers, and more.  The calculated average capital cost to build a plant (i.e., 
total capital outlay divided by annual bushel processing capacity) was $3.86/bu.  
This bricks and mortar investment figure of $3.86/bu. can be compared to the cost 
per bushel for a farmer to virtually invest in an ethanol plant via the VEST model.  
To do so, equation (1) can best be re-expressed on a simplified basis as, 
 
2) VESTe = MKT CAP / Bushel Capacity 
 
where VESTe is the cost of the processing capacity for a bushel of corn to be 
converted into ethanol, MKT CAP is a publicly-traded ethanol company’s total 
number of shares outstanding times the market price of those shares of stock, and 
Bushel Capacity is the ethanol processing company’s annual total corn input 
volume.   
 
The companies to which we can apply equation (2) are Aventine Renewable Energy 
(AVR), MGP Ingredients (MGPI), Pacific Ethanol (PIEX), and VeraSun Energy 
(VSE).  All four of these companies have the vast majority, or the entirety, of their  
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assets devoted to ethanol processing.  Exhibit 2 calculates VESTe over an eighteen 
month period dating back to July 2006.  This is as far as one can go back as stock in 
both VeraSun and Pacific Ethanol only began trading in June 2006.  VESTe ranges 
from a high of $2.11/bu. in July 2006 to a recent low of  $0.73/bu. in December 2007.   
 
Exhibit 1:  Construction Cost per bushel for a Sample of Ethanol Plants a  
        Annual  Annual     
Plant Name   Location  as of  Capacity  Capacity  Cost  Cost 
     (Mil.Gal.)        (Mil.Bu.) (Mil.  $) ($/Bu.)
ACE Ethanol, LLC  WI  2004   41.0     15.0    $ 50.0   $ 3.33 
Badger State Ethanol  WI  2002   47.0   14.8   $ 54.0   $ 3.65 
Central Illinois Energy Coop  IL  2003   38.0     11.3    $ 90.0   $ 7.96 
Commonwealth Agri-Energy 
LLC  KY  2004    20.0       8.0    $ 33.0   $ 4.13 
Cornhusker Energy 
Lexington, LLC  NE  2004    40.0     15.0    $ 50.0   $ 3.33 
Golden Grain Energy, LLC  IA  2003  40.0  15.0  $60.6   $4.04 
Great Plains Ethanol, LLC  SD  2003  40.0  15.0  $52.0   $3.47 
Husker Ag LLC  NE  2003  24.0  8.8  $29.4   $3.36 
Iowa Ethanol, LLC  IA  2004  45.0  16.0  $60.0   $3.75 
KAAPA Ethanol LLC  NE  2004  40.0  16.0  $53.0   $3.31 
Lincolnland Agri-Energy  IL  2003  40.0  16.0  57.0  3.56 
Little Sioux Corn Processors, 
LP IA  2003  40.0  15.0  $52.0    $3.47 
Mid Missouri Energy, LLC  MO  2004  40.0  15.0  $60.0   $4.00 
Midwest Grain Processors  IA  2002  45.0  17.0  $57.0   $3.35 
Northern Lights Ethanol, 
LLC SD  2002  40.0  15.0  $50.0    $3.33 
Otter Creek Ethanol, LLC  IA  2005  45.0  16.0  $60.0   $3.75 
Pine Lake Corn Processors, 
LLC IA  2005  22.0  7.0  $35.0  $5.00 
Platte Valley Fuel Ethanol, 
LLC NE  2003  40.0  15.0  $60.0  $4.00 
Quad County Corn Processors  IA  2002  18.0  7.8  $20.0  $2.56 
Sioux River Ethanol, LLC  SD  2005  45.0  15.5  $60.0  $3.87 
Tall Corn Ethanol  IA  2003  40.0  15.0  $55.0  $3.67 
United Wisconsin Grain 
Producers, LLC  WI  2005  40.0  15.0  $59.3  $3.96 
Western Plains Energy, LLC  KS  2004  30.0  10.7  $41.1  $3.84 
Averages          37.4     13.7    $ 52.1   $3.86 
a Sample taken from various internet sources and other sources on January 25 and 26, 2007.  A more 
detailed version of this table, with all web addresses and sources, is available from the authors upon 
request. 
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Exhibit 2:  Weighted Average Estimated Market Capitalization per Bushel for Four 












  ($000)        ($/Bu.) (%) (%)
July ‘06  $5,518,903  $2.11     
Aug. $4,670,160  $1.78 -15.64%   
Sept. $4,444,078  $1.70  -4.49%   
Oct. $3,271,866  $1.25  -26.47%   
Nov. $3,552,117  $1.36  8.80%   
Dec. $4,493,278  $1.72  26.47%   
Jan. ‘07  $3,821,893  $1.46  -15.12%   
Feb. $3,378,992  $1.29  -11.64%   
Mar. $3,207,555  $1.23  -4.65%   
Apr. $3,600,249  $1.38  12.20%   
May $3,531,162  $1.35  -2.17%   
June $3,006,581  $1.15  -14.81%   
July $2,888,817  $1.10  -4.35%   
Aug. $2,817,211  $1.08  -1.82%   
Sep $2,511,830  $0.96  -11.11%   
Oct. $2,000,015  $0.76  -20.83%   
Nov. $2,107,178  $0.80  5.26%   
Dec. $1,903,216  $0.73  -8.75% -65.40% 
a Ethanol manufacturing firms included are Aventine, MGP, Pacific Ethanol, and VeraSun.  
Production capacity is estimated at the 2007 level of 2,618 billion bushels per year. 
b Calculated as the sum of each individual firm’s (stock price x shares outstanding) across each of the 
four different publicly traded ethanol manufacturers.  Price in this calculation is the market close on 
the first trading day of the month from Thompson Financial.   
c This is VESTe of equation (2). Processing capacity estimated at these firms’ aggregate 2007 level of 
2,618 million bushels of corn per year.  (This means the decline in the value of market capital per 
bushel shown is an understatement as companies’ bushel processing capacity would have been 
smaller in the earlier year 2006.)  
 
 
These figures are all considerably below $3.86/bu. which was the average cost of 
construction from Exhibit 1.  This would indicate that the stock market values 
ethanol production capacity at less than those who are building (or have built) 
ethanol plants.  This fact should be a cautionary message to bricks and mortar 
investors.  When compared to a direct investment, the VEST approach offers a 
cheaper way for a farmer to invest in ethanol manufacturing capacity.3  However, it 
                                                           
3 It must also be noted that, over the eighteen months presented, exhibit 2 shows ethanol stock 
market capitalization (defined as stock price x shares outstanding) to have declined by a cumulative 
65.40%.  Thus an ethanol stock purchase and re-sale over this time would have constituted a 
significant financial loss to the investor.  
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is uncertain as to whether the stock market investors or the other non-stock market 
investors will be correct as to their relative degree of bullishness in their 
investment. 
 
Earnings from Farming and Ethanol Manufacturing  
 
When a farmer invests in the bricks and mortar of an ethanol plant, the variety of 
combined earning outcomes rendered are presented in Exhibit 3.  Running across 
the top of this table two abstractedly-simple alternatives are presented for farming 
net income, namely below normal and above normal.4  Similarly, down the left side 
of this chart two equally simple alternatives are presented for ethanol plant net 
income, again above normal and below normal.5  The recent success of the ethanol 
industry has occurred in an environment much like that of box A which depicts 
below normal corn farming net income and above normal ethanol plant net income.  
In such a case an ethanol plant investment held great appeal to many Midwestern 
farmers.  With the corn price increases beginning in the fall of 2006, it was evident  
that enough ethanol plants had been built to positively influence the price of corn.  
Farmers owning ethanol plants at this later time thus found themselves in a 
situation more similar to box B, namely that of off-farm income not being needed 
nearly as much, but plant ownership likely still helpful.  For farmer-investors, this 
was a very attractive situation marked by both above normal net income on the 
farm as well as at the plant.  Starting one year later, in the fall of 2007, it was 
evident that enough ethanol plants had been built that the situation became more 
equivalent to box C wherein farming net income remained above normal, but plant 
net income suffered.  Ironically, box C depicts a case where non-plant-investing corn 
farmers could be better off than plant-investing corn farmers.   
 
Farmer-investor concerns are reflected in a recent statement by Rick Tolman, the 
CEO of the National Corn Growers Association: “I try to remind members that this 
[an ethanol plant] is an investment, like other investments.  You decide the time to 
get in and time to get out”  (Lambrecht, p.1).  Such caution marks a contrast to the 
ethanol plant investment enthusiasm which existed over the previous several years.  
This concern motivates the corn farming industry’s on-going enthusiasm for ever 
higher reformulated gasoline requirements and raises once again the basic conflict 
explored over two decades ago by Chattin and Doering.  At that time Chattin and 
                                                           
4 Although it is very difficult to provide a precise definition of normal, the following can be said.  
Regarding farming, in a lengthy on-going farm records study, Norquist et.al calculate the 20 year 
average return on farm assets to be 9.25% in southwestern Minnesota.  Regarding ethanol, ADM’s 
20 year average return to stockholders has been 26.3%.  Admittedly, neither of these statistical 
series are entirely pure.  ADM includes many types of grain handling businesses while the 
southwestern Minnesota series includes 59% crop farms and an additional 14% which receive some 
income from cash crops.  On the positive side, both these series are actual historical information as 
opposed to being mere simulations. 
5 See footnote 4 for a definition of “normal.”   
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Exhibit 3: The Relative Need for Ethanol as an Off-Farm Income Source as 
Determined by the Four Possible Combinations of Corn Farming Net Income and 
Ethanol Plant Net Income 
  If Corn Farming  
Net Income Below Normal: 
If Corn Farming  
Net Income Above Normal: 
If Ethanol Plant  
Financial Performance 
Above Normal: 
A. Off-farm Income Needed, 
     Plant Ownership Helpful 
B.  Off-farm Income Not Needed, 
      Plant Ownership Helpful 
 




D. Off-farm Income Needed, 
     Plant Ownership Harmful 
 
 
C.  Off-farm Income Not Needed, 
      Plant Ownership Harmful 
 
 
Doering discussed the fact that corn growers advocated ethanol for its corn price 
enhancing potential (a pseudo farm policy) whereas renewable energy advocates 
preferred low corn prices as it would reduce ethanol manufacturers’ cost of goods 
(i.e., corn price). 
 
In all of the above discussed combinations of exhibit 3, either farming or ethanol 
manufacturing, or both operate in the investor-farmer’s favor.  Only box D depicts 
the simultaneous occurrence of below normal corn farming net income and below 
normal ethanol plant net income.  Corn farmers have yet to confront this 
eventuality.  However, other heavy corn using industries such as feedlots, swine 
producers, sweetener manufacturers, and feed mills have, from time to time, all 
experienced losses due to excess capacity. There is no reason to believe that the 
ethanol industry will be immune.  In the situation of box D, a farmer-investor might 
well find a publicly traded ethanol stock to have been a preferable investment vis-à-
vis an ethanol plant, as public stock shares have greater liquidity. 
 
A Corn Farmer’s Cost  
 
Using the virtual approach, how much would a farmer have to spend in order to 
own the processing capacity used to make ethanol out of his/her crop?  Exhibit 4 
shows that in the 2005-6 marketing year, the average corn grower in Iowa is 
estimated to have grown 40,952 bushels worth a total value of $75,761.   Were a 
farmer of this size to participate in building an ethanol plant in order to 
accommodate all his/her corn production, then the cost might be approximated as 
$3.86/bushel in capital (from exhibit 1) multiplied by the 40,952 bushels of corn 
production giving a total of $158,075.  When compared to this farmer’s 2005-6 corn 
sales of $75,761, such is a very large figure.  On the other hand, making this 
investment on a virtual basis would have only cost approximately $0.73/bu.in 
December 2007 (exhibit 2) times the 40,952 bushels of corn production or $29,895.  
Alternatively, in July 2006, it would have cost as high as $2.11/bu. for a total of 
$86,409.  Thus one can see that the virtual investment is the least cost approach.  
Of course, the wisdom of any ethanol investment is uncertain at this time.  One 
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important reason for this is so many plants are currently under construction.  In 
December of 2007 the Renewable Fuels Association (RFA) shows sixty-six new 
plants under construction.   Ethanol company stock prices reflect this uncertainty 
as they show a stock price decline of 65% in only one and one-half years (exhibit 2).6     
 
Exhibit 4:  Iowa Corn Production, Value of Production, Number of Farmers, and 
Associated Averages for Marketing Years 2002-3 to 2005-6. 
  2002-3 2003-4 2004-5 2005-6 
Iowa Corn Production (000 bu.)a 1,931,550 1,868,300 2,244,400 2,162,500 
 
Value of Iowa Corn Production 
($000)a $4,288,041 $4,427,871 $4,466,356 $4,000,625 
 
No. of Iowa Corn Farmersb 52,806 52,806 52,806 52,806 
 
Averages per Iowa Corn Farmer:     
     Dollars  $81,204  $83,852  $84,580  $75,761 
     Corn Production  









a USDA-NASS. Agricultural Statistics, various years. 
b USDA. Census of Agriculture.  2002. 
 
 
Ethanol Plant Downstream Investment - Marketing 
 
The VEST model was originally conceived as a theoretical means by which farmers 
could integrate farther downstream in their marketing chain, in effect adding value 
to the raw commodity they grow.  Accordingly, the model sprang from the size of a 
farmer’s annual crop production and used that as a means to calibrate the cost of 
purchasing stock in publicly held firms so as to virtually process farm output.  In 
like fashion, one can apply the VEST model to the farther downstream integration 
of an ethanol plant.   
 
Most ethanol is used by automobile fuel blenders to make either E-15 (a fifteen 
percent ethanol/gasoline product) or, less commonly, E-85 (an eighty five percent 
ethanol/gasoline product).  Accordingly, when applying the VEST model here, the 
ideal company to invest in would be one whose assets were focused on the blending, 
marketing, and retailing of gasoline.  As such the largest five US oil companies, 
Exxon, Chevron, Conoco-Phillips, Shell, and BP, would not be ideal candidates 
because much of their capital structure is devoted to oil exploration, recovery, and 
transportation. 
                                                           
6 Another key reason for uncertainty regards the need to continue the blender’s credit of $0.52 per 
gallon of ethanol used in motor fuels.  This will be an on-going political effort, and an uncertainty, 
facing many involved in the ethanol industry. 
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Exhibit 5 presents a December 2006 calculation of VEST coefficients for eight US oil 
companies potentially more suitable to the case at hand.  These have a business 
emphasis on the downstream activities of refining, blending, delivery, and retailing.  
Valero is largest with market capitalization of $36.6 billion while Delek US 
Holdings is smallest with market capitalization of $1.1 billion.  The VEST 
coefficients for these eight companies range from a high of 1.07 in the case of 
Frontier Oil to a low of 0.26 in the case of Sunoco.  Exact reasons for variation are 
unknown as each company has a somewhat unique business model and each is also 
evaluated differently by stock market investors.  When a weighted average is taken 
amongst these eight companies, the vest coefficient is 0.43.  In other words, when 
taken as a group, these eight oil marketing companies have a stock market 
evaluation equal to 43% of their cost of goods for processing and subsequent resale. 
 












   ($000)    ($000)  
Alon USA Energy  ALJ  $1,366,320 $2,734,000  0.50 
Delek US Holdings  DK  $1,112,480 $2,818,000  0.39 
Frontier Oil   FTO  $4,406,000 $4,115,000  1.07 
Holly Corp.  HOC  $2,875,670 $3,349,000  0.86 
Sunoco SUN  $8,507,050  $32,947,000  0.26 
Tesoro TSO  $6,557,280  $16,314,000  0.40 
Valero Energy  VLO  $36,686,559 $81,267,000  0.45 
Western Refining  WNR  $1,729,310 $3,653,000  0.47 
Totals / Average    $63,240,669 $147,197,000  0.43 
a Source: Thompson Financial for the fiscal years ending 12/31/06. 
b vest coefficient = (market capitalization / cost of goods sold). 
 
 
The product of this vest coefficient of 0.43 and an ethanol plant’s annual sales 
determines the amount of stock needed to virtually account for the capital cost (and 
reap the benefit from) the downstream sale of ethanol.  Ethanol plant sales, as 
shown in figure 1, averaged 37.4 million gallons.  If multiplied by the Nebraska 
2007 average ethanol price of $2.24/gal. (Jan. – Nov. basis) an ethanol plant’s 
annual sales can be estimated at $83.8 million.  Thus the virtual amount of stock an 
ethanol plant would need to purchase to reach VEST would be $36.0 million (that’s 
.43 x $83.8 mil.).  On a per bushel basis (using the 13.7 million bushel plant input 
average in exhibit 1) this investment equals $2.62/bu.  Hence one can see that to 
receive such downstream earnings, substantial investment is required relative to 
the cost of an ethanol plant itself.  (From exhibit 1, it can be seen that the ethanol 
plant itself is estimated to cost $3.86/bu.).  With or without such a virtual 
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downstream investment, ethanol plant owners still need to search for the best 
possible way to sell their physical commodity.    
 
Ethanol Plant Downstream Investment - Transportation  
 
According to Denicoff, “in 2005, rail was the primary transportation mode for 
ethanol, shipping 60 percent of ethanol production” (p.6).  Denicoff also notes, 
“concern about the adequacy of transportation infrastructure to efficiently ship 
ethanol and co-products” (p.7).  If ethanol plant management wants to take some 
protection from this problem, an application of the VEST model could be made to 
rail transportation as follows.  Namely, 
 
3) VESTr = EPHC x (MKT CAP / TRR) 
 
where VESTr is the dollar amount of railroad stock an ethanol manufacturer would 
need to purchase to be fully vested in the capital requirement of its rail shipping 
needs, EPHC is the annual rail hauling cost of the ethanol plant, MKT CAP stands 
for the market capitalization of the publicly-held railroad company which is 
shipping the plant’s ethanol, and TRR is this railroad’s total annual revenue.   
 
Equation (3) can be quantified for 2006 as follows.  The Burlington Northern Sante 
Fe railroad (stock symbol BNI) had a VEST coefficient (MKT CAP / TRR) of $2.94 
million in MKT CAP divided by $14,985 in TRR or 0.20.   An estimate of EPHC can 
be taken from Denicoff who reported that the single car rate to ship ethanol from 
the Midwest to west coast markets was $5,300 per car for a 29,400 gallon railcar.  
Our average plant from exhibit 1 produced 37.4 million gallons of ethanol per year.  
Thus 1,272 cars would be shipped annually for a total EPHC of $6,742,000.  
Multiplying this amount by the 0.20 VEST coefficient yields VESTr  of $1,348,000.  
When VESTr is divided by corn input of 13,700,000 bushels (from exhibit 1), the per 
bushel cost of reaching VEST would be $0.10/bu.  This then would be a per bushel 
approximation of the amount of BNI stock such an ethanol plant could choose to 
purchase so as to realize an investment return from general (not necessarily 




Many Midwestern corn farmers have already chosen to invest heavily in a bricks 
and mortar extension of their farms into ethanol manufacturing.  We present the 
VEST model first as a means to understand what the stock market can tell us about 
these investments.  We conclude that the stock market values ethanol companies at 
less than the cost to build their physical plant.  This may be because the U.S. stock 
market is discounting the future success of all new public companies in the ethanol 
industry or simply because the present financial outlook for the industry is not a 
good one.  We show that farmers investing in ethanol plants face a changed matrix 
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of outcome and risk.  In the present environment of above normal farm earnings 
this may be tolerable.  However, should it be the case that farm earnings retreat 
from their above normal levels while ethanol plant earnings are also at below 
normal levels, it is the case that stock market investments in ethanol can hold more 
appeal than direct investment due to the stock market’s greater liquidity.  Lastly, 
we suggest that ethanol plant owners themselves might consider using the VEST 
model to capture downstream returns from the ethanol they produce and/or to limit 
exposure to transportation expenses.  Stock market investment to capture 
downstream marketing returns is very costly; almost equaling the cost of an ethanol 
plant itself.  Taking protection from transportation cost problems associated with 
rents imposed by rail carriers is far less costly to do.   
 
Siebert, Jones and Sporleder state, “VEST must be viewed not so much as an 
optimization strategy but instead as one dimension among many to be included in 
the farmer’s evaluation of any new value added investment” (p. 566).  Great 
uncertainty exists surrounding US ethanol plant profitability.  Factors such as 
ethanol supply, the US government’s ethanol blending credit of $0.52/gal., the 
supply of corn, the price of oil, and many other factors will determine the future 
profitability of this industry.  Further, trends regarding many of these matters have 
been at least partially responsible for increases in world grain prices.  As 
agribusiness managers at all levels in the food marketing chain continue to adapt to 
such price change, future research on the potential of virtual investment concepts is 
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